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Introduction
Global biosurveillance is crucial for the identification and prevention of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases, and its usefulness in public health and animal health has been amply demonstrated throughout its long history (1, 2) . The operational definition of biosurveillance as discussed and used throughout this review is as follows: 'Biosurveillance is the process of gathering, integrating, interpreting, and communicating essential information related to all hazards, threats, or disease activity affecting human, animal, or plant health to achieve early detection and warning, contribute to overall situational awareness of the health aspects of an incident, and to enable better decision-making at all levels' (3).
Although newly created biosurveillance systems are often intended to complement or expand the capabilities of existing systems, current global biosurveillance capacity has rarely been comprehensively documented or reviewed in a single journal article, government report, or other scholarly literature. Since these biosurveillance systems have not been documented and compiled into a single report, determining the potential impact, need for and usefulness of new biosurveillance systems is difficult (4) . Without awareness of the current global biosurveillance landscape, there is a risk of misallocating resources through unnecessary duplication of biosurveillance systems in some areas, while potentially leaving gaps in coverage in other areas.
The increased risk of infectious disease emergence and the development of new technologies to detect infectious disease outbreaks have led to a new era of biosurveillance research and development (4, 5, 6, 7) . The 2005 revision of the 1969 International Health Regulations (IHR) reflects the growing need for timely, accurate and integrated biosurveillance systems and tools. The revised IHR outline novel system requirements for sensitivity, timeliness, stability, flexibility, data quality and reporting from the local to the global scale (8) . In 2012, the Office of the President of the United States released its first National Strategy for Biosurveillance, stating that a well-integrated, national biosurveillance system was imperative for decision-making at all levels (9) . The 2005 IHR noted that biosurveillance systems often lack cohesion within countries and across global boundaries, a factor that limits their effectiveness in detecting emerging disease threats (8) .
While there has been much focus on describing how biosurveillance systems should be designed and how they should function, a comprehensive review of all existing biosurveillance systems would be extremely useful to identify the gaps between existing surveillance systems and to determine what types of biosurveillance systems are currently needed. In this paper, the authors attempt to respond to this challenge.
In this study, past and present biosurveillance systems were collected and categorised into a comprehensive data set. The collected data include information on current biosurveillance systems, failed or discontinued systems, and biosurveillance pilot studies. These data also describe global biosurveillance capacity over time and can be used to identify gaps in the capabilities of current global public health biosurveillance systems. Additionally, biosurveillance system counts, ownership and composition are analysed over time. Lastly, the geographical density of biosurveillance systems is analysed and gaps in biosurveillance coverage are identified. The results of this study have the potential to guide improvements in future biosurveillance research and development.
Methods

Operational definitions
A major obstacle in the study of biosurveillance is the lack of consistent, accepted and widely adopted definitions for the various types of biosurveillance methods and systems currently in use (10) . As biosurveillance has moved beyond governmental institutions and into the realm of organisations such as hospitals, zoos, businesses, technology companies and non-profit organisations, information streams have diversified to include a variety of non-traditional data streams (e.g. Twitter, Facebook and Instagram) (7) . The lack of consistent operational definitions and growing diversity of organisations engaged in biosurveillance activities demand a biosurveillance lexicon that incorporates strict operational definitions (10, 11) .
To facilitate the authors' analysis, concise operational definitions were established through a literature review (see below) before data were collected. These definitions were selected using a modified Delphi method and employed biosurveillance experts to create comprehensive operational definitions.
Data
Systematic data collection was used to identify and catalogue local, regional and global biosurveillance systems that had previously collected or currently collect data on human, animal or plant health, in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and MetaAnalyses (PRISMA) guidelines for systematic reviews (12 ). An intensive literature review was conducted to uncover pilot programmes and historic systems that may be poorly documented on the Internet (Table I) .
Biosurveillance system
Biosurveillance is the process of systematically gathering, integrating, analysing and disseminating information related to human, animal or plant health (3, 13) . This definition includes both systems that continuously collect health data, and systems that were established for use in outbreaks but remain dormant until activated.
Laboratory-based surveillance
Laboratory-based surveillance systems are biosurveillance systems that rely on laboratory confirmation of disease presence. Examples of laboratory-based surveillance include confirmed case counts from hospitals, clinics and laboratory testing reports.
Syndromic surveillance
At present, there is no consensus on what constitutes syndromic surveillance. Most uses of the term refer to data collected on health events without confirmed laboratory identification. The common goal of syndromic surveillance is to identify disease clusters earlier than with traditional methods (1, 2) . In this study, syndromic surveillance is defined as the systematic collection, analysis and dissemination of a broad array of non-laboratory-based data (11, 14, 15) .
In this study, 'pre-diagnostic' refers to case counts without laboratory-confirmed diagnosis. Therefore, systems that count clinical diagnoses based on symptoms and syndromes are identified as syndromic surveillance. Justification for this distinction includes the clinical overlap of disease symptoms (i.e. fever, diarrhoea), the low specificity of interim case definitions in outbreak settings (16) , and the necessity for laboratory-based analysis in identifying most infectious disease agents. Other examples of syndromic surveillance include trends in purchasing over-the-counter medications, self-reporting and Internet search queries.
Analyses
Initial searches were designed to cast a wide net and locate as many potential biosurveillance systems as possible. After preliminary data collection, candidate biosurveillance systems were reviewed to ensure that they met this study' s operational definitions of biosurveillance (see above) and the inclusion/exclusion criteria (Table II) . Laboratory networks, alert and communication systems, epidemiological reports, and past biosurveillance efforts were all reviewed and ultimately included in the final database. Capacitybuilding programmes, education or advocacy groups, informal communication forums on biosurveillance, and pilot systems that were proposed but never initiated were excluded.
Websites and peer-reviewed literature associated with each biosurveillance system were reviewed to determine:
i) the sector of the organisation that created the system (government, non-profit or for-profit)
ii) the date on which the system was created iii) the date on which the system was terminated iv) the geographical area surveyed (global, country, region or city)
v) the types of data collected vi) whether the system performed active, passive, syndromic or Web-activity surveillance vii) the type of organism monitored by the system (humans, animals or plants)
viii) the specific symptoms or diseases under surveillance. Government agencies and intergovernmental bodies (e.g. the European Commission) were identified as belonging to the government sector. Organisations selfdescribed as non-profit or not-for-profit, registered charities, or in equivalent language were considered part of the non-profit sector, while corporations were classified as 'for-profit' bodies. Data sources were classified as per Table I . Data were aggregated and summarised in R (Version 3.2. 2, 2015) , an open-source software package.
Results
The first round of data collection identified 980 potential biosurveillance systems. Two hundred and sixty systems were flagged for potential exclusion (Table II) . Data were also collected on the creation and termination date of each biosurveillance system (Fig. 2) . Of the 815 biosurveillance systems in the database, 682 provided information on the year of creation and (unless the system is currently active) the year of termination. Biosurveillance systems are active for an average of 11.35 years (median: 9). Biosurveillance system creation peaked in 2006, tailing off in subsequent years. The termination of active systems increased significantly after 2000, peaking in 2013 (Fig. 2) . Accounting for system creation and termination, the largest concurrent number of active surveillance systems was 513, which occurred in 2011.
The United States had the largest number of biosurveillance systems (290). However, the number of biosurveillance systems per country is not a meaningful measure of biosurveillance effort, as the US also covers a larger area and has a larger population than many other countries. To correct for this potential bias, the number of biosurveillance systems per capita was plotted for each country. Biosurveillance systems per capita may better illustrate biosurveillance coverage than raw counts of biosurveillance systems. Consequently, developed nations have more systems per capita than developing nations (Fig. 3) . The US, for example, has 0.05 systems per 100,000 people.
The country with the highest number of biosurveillance systems per capita is Tuvalu, with 40.4 per 100,000 people. However, Tuvalu' s comparatively small population inflates this value. The countries with the fewest biosurveillance systems per capita are Iran (0.001), China (0.001) and India (0.001).
Laboratory-based biosurveillance was the predominant type of biosurveillance. Both laboratory-based and syndromic biosurveillance systems were created at about the same rate until the year 2000, when the creation rate of syndromic systems began to outpace that of laboratory-based systems.
The total global number of syndromic systems overtook laboratory-based systems in 2008, and the number of syndromic biosurveillance systems has continued to grow. The number of laboratory-based systems peaked in 2011 at 131, and fell to 99 laboratory-based systems that were still active in 2016. The number of syndromic systems peaked at 135 in 2011, and fell to 127 syndromic systems that were still active in 2016. Fifty-six per cent of biosurveillance systems were labelled as either 'laboratory-based' or 'syndromic'.
Six hundred and forty-six surveillance systems were independently operated by government-sector organisations, 95 were operated solely by non-profit organisations, and 17 were operated by private, for-profit companies. In regard to partnerships, 33 surveillance systems were operated by government and non-profit bodies in partnership; eight were operated by partnerships between government and forprofit companies; and two were operated by government, private and non-profit organisations in collaboration.
Most biosurveillance systems conducted human biosurveillance (706 were mixed systems, while 598 were human-only systems). These were followed by animal surveillance systems (180 mixed, 57 animal-only systems), and plants (66 mixed, 14 plant-only systems). One hundred and five systems collected information on both humans and animals, while 31 collected information on all three classes of organisms. 
Discussion
Through a systematic search-and-review process, an extensive database of local, regional, national and global biosurveillance systems that currently collect infectious disease data on humans, animals and plants was created. Eight hundred and fifteen systems were included in the final analysis. In the period between 2010 and 2014, the number of biosurveillance systems created and terminated each year varied substantially (Fig. 2) . This suggests that there may have been a high degree of experimentation in these years, 
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The spatial distribution of biosurveillance systems by country per 10,000 people in 2016 White on the map represents no data and does not necessarily mean that there are no systems in those locations (e.g. Antarctica, Greenland and Sudan). In fact, Sudan is routinely named in ProMED-mail reports, which sometimes include health news reports during which many systems were created and initiated but not maintained. This finding could be affected by information bias, as an Internet presence that contained creation and termination dates may have become more common for systems created after 2010.
In 2011-2014, the number of systems terminated exceeded the number of systems created, causing the overall number of active biosurveillance systems to fall for the first time (Figs 1, 2 & 4) . While this could be due to information bias or inherent biases in the data collection procedure, economic factors are more likely to have caused this decrease in the number of biosurveillance systems. The global financial crisis in 2008 had a severe impact on the US economy and, consequently, government spending on healthcare plateaued in the following years, with the slowest growth in spending in recent history (20) . As 290 of the 815 systems analysed (approximately 36%) were US-based, the downturn in government spending in the US was associated with a large drop in the number of biosurveillance systems globally.
One of this study' s hypotheses is that the existence of multiple biosurveillance systems would tend to improve both the overall sensitivity of biosurveillance (i.e. the likelihood of detecting an event) and the timeliness of reporting (the period between an event and its discovery and reporting). Some evidence supports this hypothesis.
Chan et al. (21) studied the duration between an outbreak and its discovery and public communication, using a series of outbreaks confirmed by WHO. It is interesting to note that, during the period of the study, between 1996 and 2009, a time associated with rapid growth in the number of biosurveillance systems, the time lag between outbreak and discovery declined substantially, from nearly 30 days to 13.5 days, and the time between outbreak and public reporting declined from 40 days to 19. This suggests an association between the global number of biosurveillance systems and the ability to rapidly detect infectious disease outbreaks. It is significant that the number of syndromic systems expanded at an especially rapid rate during this period. However, this possible association between the global number of biosurveillance systems and the increasing speed of outbreak detection is heavily confounded, most notably by advances in technology, data analysis and digital communication. Multiple biosurveillance systems tend to complement each other. Consequently there is collinearity between the number of systems in use and the speed of detection. Barboza et al. (22) examined the sensitivity and speed of detection of outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 in humans and animals during March 2010, using six well-characterised biosurveillance systems. These systems varied in sensitivity and speed at reporting H5N1 outbreaks during this period, and overall sensitivity and timeliness were optimised by using a virtual combination of the six systems. Interestingly, the Barboza study used a method to improve data quality (retrospectively) by combining disparate data sources and then subsequently filtering out low-quality biosurveillance data. When considering the findings of the Barboza study with those of the present study, we must bear in mind that more biosurveillance systems do not necessarily lead to better outbreak detection. It is just as likely that higher fidelity data, because of improved technology, may have led to faster outbreak detection in recent years and the contraction of underperforming surveillance systems.
Syndromic surveillance
Initially developed as a tool to detect large-scale bioterrorism, the field of syndromic surveillance has greatly expanded over the past 20 years (11). Two hundred and sixty of the systems in the authors' database analyse syndromic data and Figure 4 depicts a significant increase in the proportion of biosurveillance systems analysing syndromic surveillance from 1980 to the present.
The advent, adoption and distribution of Internet access is a contributing factor, as is technology, to the expansion of syndromic surveillance because the Internet has made it much easier to collect, share and analyse the data that are used for this type of surveillance. Most disease surveillance systems are disease-specific (2). However, this trend could be changing as more syndromic surveillance systems focus on information communicated by people over the Internet, which is then stored and available for rapid analysis. Additionally, the Internet has made new types of syndromic data, such as social media, search queries, and websiteaccess log data, publicly available (5, 23, 24) . However, the value of these data and their impact on public health has yet to be quantified and determined.
Geographical analysis
A visualisation of the global distribution of biosurveillance systems by country, per capita, depicts the range of biosurveillance capacity by country (Fig. 3) . It clearly illustrates that developed nations have more biosurveillance coverage per capita than developing nations. Since most biosurveillance systems are government-run or funded, wealthy nations are more likely to be able to afford broader biosurveillance coverage across their population and more biosurveillance systems to cover the population.
This illustration also indicates that China has very low biosurveillance coverage per capita, which could be associated with the major infectious disease outbreaks in China (e.g. SARS, HPAI) over the last 15 years (25).
Wealth-associated factors, including reliable Internet access and mobile phone usage, may also contribute to higher biosurveillance coverage, particularly syndromic surveillance. Future analyses could compare biosurveillance coverage with historical outbreak and disease risk data, and other aspects of a country' s infrastructure. This study' s geographical analysis of biosurveillance system coverage (Fig. 3 ) may be limited, due to information bias. The current analysis may be less representative of actual biosurveillance capacity in resource-poor zones, where biosurveillance system documentation is limited.
Furthermore, the number of surveillance systems per capita is not a perfect measure of biosurveillance system reach. Countries with densely populated areas may cover large swathes of population within the catchment area of fewer surveillance systems than a country with the same population spread more evenly across a large area. The countries with populations that are more evenly distributed spatially would appear darker on this map, with fewer biosurveillance systems per capita. Countries with small, dense and more uniformly distributed populations that are covered by many overlapping biosurveillance systems (e.g. smaller European countries in the European Union) will have more systems per capita than neighbouring countries that do not benefit from the coverage of overlapping biosurveillance systems. Nonetheless, this is probably a better measure than a raw count of biosurveillance systems per country, which can be biased by countries that are covered by many regional biosurveillance systems.
Biosurveillance ownership
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that biosurveillance has historically been conducted by national government bodies. From 2005 onwards, the type of organisation involved in biosurveillance has diversified. The rise of syndromic surveillance methods that can harness an expansive range of unstructured data sources has likely served as a catalyst to biosurveillance diversification, allowing non-profit organisations, private bodies and universities to become key stakeholders in the research and development of new biosurveillance methods. Despite this, government agencies remain the primary owners of biosurveillance capacity and data (Figs 1 & 2) , often funding non-profit organisations through grants and sometimes working in tandem with private organisations to gather and collect health data. These findings indicate that global biosurveillance may be limited, and public health jeopardised, if biosurveillance is overly controlled by governmental organisations. This is especially the case when governments are incentivised to avoid reporting infectious disease outbreaks, due to the severe negative economic implications of outbreaks (26) .
'One Health'
Of the 815 systems surveyed, the majority were involved in the discrete biosurveillance of human, animal or plant data. Several systems (105) collected human and animal data, and fewer (31) collected data on all three categories. With growing recognition among scientists and policy-makers of the interdependency of human, animal and environmental health, and the consequent importance of the 'One Health' movement, the number of mixed-subject biosurveillance systems may increase in the future. Since 60% of human infectious diseases are caused by pathogens shared with wild or domestic animals, the simultaneous biosurveillance of animals and humans is crucial in detecting and mitigating the risk of infectious disease (27) . Hopefully, the publication of this database (https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/ 0B4hXKAFeFEWwRDhtMzFKYkpaS0U?usp=sharing) will encourage the merging of human, animal and plant surveillance systems to coalesce and coordinate risk mitigation efforts and identify infectious disease spread at the critical point before an outbreak becomes an epidemic.
Conclusion
Biosurveillance is not a new area of study and was first established over 600 years ago (28) . While the biosurveillance database created for this review is substantial, it is not a complete or exhaustive list of biosurveillance efforts globally or throughout history.
Factors that limited the completeness of the authors' data collection included time and labour constraints, and the limited accessibility of information. In some cases, detailed information on systems was protected, or required organisational clearance for access. Even when resources were publicly available, sources were often incomplete and vague, lacking basic information about the system. Details about system characteristics such as data sources, dates of creation and termination, activity status and geographical range were not always available via the literature or websites, leaving gaps in the data.
The goal of biosurveillance is extremely timely and accurate disease detection (29) . Unfortunately, many biosurveillance systems are siloes that do not usefully share the information they collect, limiting their power and ability to inform policy and direct public health action. Public health benefits the most when biosurveillance information facilitates the accurate diagnosis of symptoms to create concise case definitions rapidly (30) . The early identification of cases can result in significant economic savings and greatly reduce the number of cases (plant, animal, human or all combined) (31) . As public health and biosurveillance advance, free and open data-sharing is necessary to detect rapidly spreading disease outbreaks and respond to them before they become epidemics. Enhanced international mechanisms for outbreak detection, alert and response will be needed, and data-sharing may be able to help to bolster outbreak detection (32) . Infectious disease reports are increasingly being added to the Internet, and the technological advances and data available on the Internet will make sharing biosurveillance data easier and faster (33) . As biosurveillance has been, and will continue to be, an integral tool in monitoring global public health, the current state of biosurveillance needs to be monitored to avoid the unnecessary duplication of systems and to ensure complete geographical monitoring of infectious disease outbreaks.
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